Even in its earlier phases, analytic philosophy was difficult to define in terms of its intrinsic features or fundamental philosophical commitments. Consequently, it has always relied on contrasts with other approaches to philosophy—especially approaches to which it found itself fundamentally opposed—to help clarify its own nature. Initially, it was opposed to British Idealism, and then to “traditional philosophy” at large.
即使是在分析哲学的早期阶段，其也很难用本质的特征和其它基本的哲学要素来定义。因此，它依赖于和其他哲学方式，尤其是哪些它所主张反对的哲学方式来形成对立，并以此来说明分析哲学本质的特点。起初，它反对的是英国唯心主义，然后扩大到反对传统哲学研究（即形而上学）
Later, it found itself opposed both to classical Phenomenology (for example, Husserl) and its offspring, such as Existentialism (Sartre, Camus, and so forth) and also “Continental”’ or “Postmodern” philosophy (Heidegger, Foucault and Derrida). Though classical Pragmatism bears some similarity to early analytic philosophy, especially in the work of C. S. Peirce and C. I. Lewis, the pragmatists are usually understood as constituting a separate tradition or school.
之后，分析哲学不但反对传统现象学（例如，胡塞尔）并且它的后继学说，例如存在主义（萨特，加缪等等）和“欧陆哲学”或者“后现代哲学”（海德格尔， 傅科，德里达)。尽管传统的实用主义哲学在某些方面和早期的分析哲学较为相似，尤其是皮尔斯和刘易斯所作的工作中，但实用主义者通常被理解为一个分离于传统哲学或经院哲学之外的组织。
1. The Revolution of Moore and Russell: Cambridge Realism and The Linguistic Turn
“It was towards the end of 1898,” wrote Bertrand Russell,
that Moore and I rebelled against both Kant and Hegel. Moore led the way, but I followed closely in his footsteps…. I felt a great liberation, as if I had escaped from a hot house onto a windswept headland. In the first exuberance of liberation, I became a naïve realist and rejoiced in the thought that grass really is green. (Russell 1959, 22)
罗素回忆，“那是1898年的年末，穆尔和我开始反对康德和黑格尔的哲学观点。穆尔开创了这一新的方向，并且我紧随他的步伐，我感到完全地解放，就像我刚从一个温暖的屋子中逃出到一个暴露在风雨中的山岬。起初，由于心中洋溢着自由的喜悦，我成为了一个朴素的现实主义者，并且开心地认为草真的是绿的（暗示我们所见的即为真实，标准的现实主义者的看法）（罗素，1959,22）
This important event in Russell’s own intellectual history turned out to be decisive for the history of twentieth-century philosophy as a whole; for it was this revolutionary break with British Idealism—then the most influential school of philosophical thought in the British universities—that birthed analytic philosophy and set it on the path to supplanting both Idealism and philosophy as traditionally conceived and practiced.
这个发生于罗素个人发展历史中的重要事件也成为了整个二十世纪哲学史上的关键时刻。由于它是一个具有革命性的节点——反对英国唯心主义（最有影响力的哲学学派在英国大学中）——然后诞生出了分析哲学并且指出了一条代替唯心主义和传统哲学的新的道路。
To understand Russell’s elation at the rebellion, one needs to know something about him and also something about British Idealism. Let’s begin with the latter.
为了理解罗素为何对于这次解放如此兴奋，我们需要了解罗素本人以及一些关于英国唯心主义的知识。所以让我们从下面开始吧。At the end of the 19th century, F.H. Bradley, Bernard Bosanquet, and J.M.E. McTaggart were the leading British Idealists. They claimed that the world, although it naively appears to us to be a collection of discrete objects (this bird, that table, the earth and the sun, and so forth), is really a single indivisible whole whose nature is mental, or spiritual, or Ideal rather than material.
在十九世纪的末端， F.H. Bradley, Bernard Bosanquet, and J.M.E. McTaggart是英国唯心主义的主要领导人物。他们声称这个世界，尽管从表面上呈现给我们的是一种离散的物体的集合，实际上是一个本质为精神，或者心灵而不是物质上的整体。
Thus, idealism was a brand of metaphysical monism, but not a form of materialism, the other leading form of metaphysical monism. It was also a form of what we would now call anti-realism, since it claimed that the world of naïve or ordinary experience is something of an illusion. Their claim was not that the objects of ordinary experience do not exist, but that they are not, as we normally take them to be, discrete.
因此，唯心主义实际上是形而上学一元论的一种表现形式，而不是形而上学一元论的另一种唯物主义的形式。同时，它也是一种反实在论的表现形式，因为他们声称关于日常或朴素的经验完全是一种错觉。他们声称，并不是我们日常所经验到的这些物质不存在，而是他们不是以我们所认为的离散的方式而存在。
Instead, every object exists and is what it is at least partly in virtue of the relations it bears to other things—more precisely, to all other things. This was called the doctrine of internal relations. Since, on this view, everything that exists does so only in virtue of its relations to everything else, it is misleading to say of any one thing that it exists simpliciter. The only thing that exists simpliciter is the whole—the entire network of necessarily related objects.
相反地，每种物体都存在，并且是以一种和其它物质至少部分相联系的方式而存在，或者更确切的说，是与每一种其它的物体相联系。因此，以这种观点来看，每个物体都是因和其它所有物体所相联系而存在，故如果说，任何一个物体绝对地存在，那么必然是一种误解。唯一绝对存在的事物就是整体，整个必要事物相联系的关系。
Correspondingly, the Idealists believed that no statement about some isolated object could be true simpliciter, since, on their view, to speak of an object in isolation would be to ignore the greater part of the truth about it, namely, its relations to everything else.
因此，唯心主义者认为，任何关于一些孤立物体的论述都不能绝对地正确，因此，从他们的角度来看，如果单独言说一个孤立的物体，将会错过绝大部分有关于此的